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In a framework of a unionised international Bertrand duopoly with differentiated 
products, this paper analyses national labour market interdependencies and the 
consequences of trade liberalisation for union wages. The analysis suggests that 
national wages are likely to be strategic complements (substitutes), if products are 
ordinary substitutes (complements). Under the assumption of linear demand it is 
shown that bilateral trade liberalisation always leads to higher union set wages   
and union utilities, regardless of the nature of product rivalry. Analysing the 
consequences of unilateral tariff reductions it is shown that foreign tariff   
reductions always give rise to higher union wages and utilities, whereas the   
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The ongoing process of increasing product market integration raises the   
interesting question as to how collective bargaining outcomes will be affected by   
the removal of international trade restrictions. This issue is of particular interest as 
increasing international competition is usually regarded as placing substantial 
downward pressure on national bargaining systems, thereby suggesting organised 
labour as a major advocate for protectionist policies. 
However, empirical work on the relationship between trade liberalisation and   
wage formation generally presents mixed evidence on this issue (see e.g. GASTON  
and TREFLER, 1995, KONINGS and VANDENBUSSCHE, 1995). This mixed empirical 
evidence is in line with the results derived by the theoretical literature analysing   
trade liberalisation in the presence of unions in imperfectly competitive product 
markets. HUIZINGA (1993) and SØRENSEN (1993), who model product market 
integration as a dichotomous shift from a no-trade to a full trade equilibrium, find  
that integration lowers union wages due to the additional entry of foreign   
competitors into the product market. BRANDER and SPENCER (1988) and   
MEZZETTI and DINOPOULUS (1991) analyse trade policies in a unionised   
international oligopoly, where firms compete for sales in the domestic market. 
Modelling product market integration as a reduction in tariffs, both studies   
generally suggest that wages are positively related to protection. NAYLOR (1998) 
extends the one-way trade framework of BRANDER and SPENCER (1988) and 
MEZZETTI and DINOPOULUS (1991) to a model of intra-industry trade in the spirit  
of BRANDER (1981) and BRANDER and KRUGMAN (1983). He investigates how   
trade liberalisation affects union wages and employment, when firms export part   
of their production abroad. In contrast to the former studies, NAYLOR’S (1998)   
results show that in an intra-industry trade regime bilateral trade liberalisation   
may lead to higher union set wages: With reciprocal trade, unions suffer from 
increased foreign competition in the domestic market, but simultaneously benefit   
from enhanced export possibilities in the foreign market, which may give rise to 
higher labour demand and thereby higher wages. The contradictory results to 
HUIZINGA (1993) and SØRENSEN (1993) arise, since NAYLOR (1998) considers   
tariff reductions starting from a position where trade already takes place. FISHER  
  2and WRIGHT (1999), who take NAYLOR’S analysis further by investigating   
regional free trade agreements and bargaining outcomes in a three-country model,  
also find a negative relationship between wages and protection. 
A common feature of the literature analysing trade liberalisation in the presence of 
unions is the assumption of Cournot quantity competition in a homogeneous   
product market. To date, no attempt has been made in the literature to analyse the 
impact of tariff removals on union wages with price setting competition in a 
differentiated product market. The present paper therefore attempts to fill this gap  
and examines the impact of tariff reduction with Bertrand conjectures and 
differentiated goods. A related paper is that of BANDYOPADHYAY et al. (2000),   
who analyse optimal export subsidies in a unionised Bertrand duopoly. While the 
focus of their analysis is on optimal trade policies, the present paper differs from  
their analysis in concentrating on the impact of trade liberalisation on union   
wages. Moreover, we consider import tariffs instead of export subsidies, which   
gives rise to additional ambiguities when analysing the impact of trade   
liberalisation on optimal union wages. 
In the following analysis, equilibrium prices, quantities and wages are determined  
in a two-stage game: In the first stage, unions determine their optimal wage, i.e.   
we adopt the so called monopoly union approach. In the second stage, firms are 
engaged in Bertrand price-competition, i.e. each firm sets its price so as to   
maximise its profit, taking the rival’s price as given. Profit maximising prices then 
determine equilibrium quantities. As is usual, the game is solved by backward 
induction, i.e., the Bertrand price-setting game is analysed first. When analysing   
the impact of trade liberalisation on bargaining outcomes, the following analysis   
will be restricted to the so called right-to-manage approach (NICKELL and   
ANDREWS, 1983), where unions influence wages only, since it seems reasonable   
to assume that firms retain the discretion to set prices unilaterally
1. The rest of the 
paper is organised as follows: In Section 2 we conduct the analysis for general 
 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, one could consider the case of wage-employment bargaining (see e.g MCDONALD  
and SOLOW, 1981), constituting a two-stage game, where wages and employment (or capacity) are 
bargained over in the first stage and prices are set in the second stage of the game. However, this is 
beyond the scope of the following analysis, which will be confined to short-run price competition, 
taking capacity levels as given. 
  3product demand and union preferences in a simple inter-industry (i.e. one-way   
trade) framework, so as to highlight the general ambiguities that arise when   
analysing the impact of tariff reductions on union wages with Bertrand   
conjectures. Section 3 extends the analysis to a reciprocal trade model, but   
imposes specific functional forms for product demand and union preferences. In 
contrast to the simple one-way trade framework, the reciprocal trade model allows  
us to distinguish between unilateral and bilateral tariff reductions, which will give  
rise to different consequences concerning the attitudes of unions towards product 
market integration. 
2. Bertrand competition, union wages and inter-industry trade 
2.1. Firm objectives 
Consider a domestic and a foreign firm, producing a differentiated good and 
competing for sales in the domestic market. The home and the foreign firm are 
assumed to face direct demand functions  ) , ( Q P d x =  and    
respectively, where P is the price charged by the domestic firm and Q the price 
charged by the foreign firm. It is assumed that 
), , ( * Q P d y =
0 1 < d  and  0 2 < *
0 1 > *
d , where   denotes 
the partial derivative of product demand with respect to its i’th argument. If the 
products are (ordinary) substitutes, we have   and d , and if the products 





2 < d  and  0 1 < * d . One unit of labour 
produces one unit of output. Both firms are assumed to maximise profits, which   
are given by  
   (1)  ) , ( ) , ( ) , , ( Q P wd Q P Pd w Q P − = π
 ), , ( * ) * ( ) , ( * ) *, , , ( * Q P d t w Q P Qd t w Q P + − = π  (2) 
where  w  and  w* represent domestic and foreign wages, respectively, and t is a   
specific import tariff imposed by the domestic government. For the time being,   
the foreign wage, w*, is taken as exogenously given. 
  42.2. The Bertrand price setting game 
With Bertrand conjectures, each firm sets its price so as to maximise its profit,   
taking the rival’s price as given. First-order conditions are given by 
  0 1 1 1 = − + = wd Pd d π  (3) 
  0 * ) * ( * * * 2 2 2 . (4)  = + − + = d t w Qd d π
The non-cooperative equilibrium is characterised by the simultaneous solution of   
(3) and (4), yielding prices   and   as functions of domestic   
and foreign wages, w and w*, and the import tariff, t. Totally differentiating (3)   
and (4) yields  
) *, , ( t w w P ) *, , ( t w w Q
  dw d dQ dP 1 12 11  (5)  = +π π
  ) * ( * * * dt dw d dQ dP 2 22 21 , (6)  + = +π π















Second-order conditions require 
  0 ) ( 2 11 1 11 < − + = d w P d π  and  0 * )) * ( ( * 2 * 22 2 22 < + − + = d t w Q d π . (8) 
If   and   are positive, reaction functions are upward sloping, i.e. products  
are strategic complements (BULOW et. al., 1985). With the two products being   
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  5(ordinary) substitutes
2 (i.e. d  and  ), reaction functions are upward 
sloping, if   and d  are not too negative, since 
0 2 > 0 1 > * d
12 d 21 * 12 2 12 ) ( d w P d − + = π   
and  . Alternatively, if the products are   
complements, they will be strategic substitutes, provided that   and   are not 
too positive. Throughout the following analysis, these conditions are assumed to   
be fulfilled, so that products being substitutes imply strategic complements, and   
vice versa. 
21 1 21 * )) * ( ( * * d t w Q d + − + = π
12 d 21 * d
Comparative static effects of changes in the domestic tariff and the domestic wage 
may be obtained by application of Cramer’s rule. Assuming stability and   
uniqueness of the equilibrium, i.e.  , the impact  of a 
change in t and w on P and Q is then as follows: 
0 21 12 22 11 > − = * * DET π π π π










































Eqs. (9) reveal that the imposition of a tariff unambiguously raises the foreign   
price, Q, since a tariff raises the foreign firm’s marginal cost. The domestic price 
response depends on whether the products are strategic complements or   
substitutes. With the products being strategic complements, the rise of the foreign 
price induces the domestic firm to charge a higher price, P. In contrast, with   
strategic substitutes, the optimal domestic price response of the home firm is to   
lower its price, P. Analogously, according to eqs. (10), a rise in the domestic wage 
unambiguously raises the domestic price, while the foreign price response will be 
positive (negative), if the products are strategic complements (substitutes).  
                                                 
2  For the sake of expositional brevity, in the following discussion ordinary substitutes and   
complements are referred to as substitutes and complements. 
 
  62.3. Union objectives 
Domestic workers are assumed to be organised by a union, which maximises the 
following utility function  
  ) ( ) ( ) ( w u x M w u x U − + ⋅ =  (11) 
where  M is membership of the union, u( · ) is the workers’ utility function over   
wages, where u  and  0 ) ( > w w 0 ) ( ≤ w uww .  w is the alternative wage which workers 
may expect to earn elsewhere in the economy. In general, w depends positively   
on the alternative outside wage as well as unemployment benefits and is   
negatively affected by the unemployment rate. (11) is referred to as an objective 
function of a utilitarian union which attempts to maximise the sum of its   
members’ utilities (OSWALD, 1982). 
2.4. Union wage setting  
According to the monopoly union approach, the domestic union maximises its   
utility function, which is given by eq. (11), with respect to the wage, w. The   
union’s optimal wage solves 
  . 0 )) ( ) ( ( ) ( = ⋅ − + ⋅ = w w w x w u w u w u x U  (12) 
Since unions correctly anticipate the impact of wages on product market   







d xw 2 1 + = . (13) 
Inserting eqs. (10) into (13) yields: 
  [ ]
DET
* d * d d
xw
21 2 22 1 1 π π −
= , (14) 
  7which is negative, provided that  2 1
) 0 ( 2< d
d d >
) 0 > d
. When choosing its optimal wage, the   
union takes into account two effects of a wage rise on domestic employment, x,  
and union utility: First, a higher wage raises the domestic price and reduces   
demand for the domestic product, which is reflected by the first summand in eq.   
(13). Second, a rise in the wage affects domestic employment via changes in the 
foreign price, which is represented by the second term in eq. (13). With products 
being substitutes (  and strategic complements, a higher wage raises the   
foreign price, thereby leading to a rise in demand for the domestic product. With  
the products being complements   and strategic substitutes, a wage increase 
leads to a reduction in the foreign price, thereby also giving rise to an increase of 
domestic demand. Stability conditions ensure that the domestic price response to   
the wage rise dominates the foreign price reaction. Moreover, the own-price effect  
on domestic demand is assumed to dominate the cross effect, i.e. 
2
2 1 d d > ,  
thereby leading to an overall decrease in domestic employment in response to a   
higher wage.  
2.5. Impact of trade liberalisation on the union wage 
Comparative static effects of a change in t on w, may be derived by applying the 








− = . (15) 
The sign of dw/dt is therefore determined by the sign of U , which is given by  wt
  )). ( ) ( ( ) ( w u w u x w u x U wt w t wt − + ⋅ =  (16) 
The literature analysing trade policies under Cournot quantity competition has   
shown that the imposition of a tariff unambiguously shifts the labour demand   
curve outwards, i.e.  , if demand is not too convex (e.g. BRANDER and   
SPENCER, 1985, 1988). The ambiguity with respect to the wage response was   
shown to result from the tariff’s impact on the slope of labour demand,  . More 
0 > t x
wt x
  8specifically, it has been shown that a sufficient condition for the union’s optimal   
wage to increase is that the labour demand curve does not become considerably   
flatter. In the Bertrand case, however, it will turn out that the adoption of general 
product demand requires additional restrictions concerning product demand so as   
to ensure that the labour demand curve shifts outwards, i.e.  . Since the aim  
of the present section is to derive this additional condition, the following   
discussion will be limited to first-order effects, i.e. the direction in which the   
labour demand curve moves,  , and it will neglect second-order effects, i.e. a   
tariff’s impact on the slope of labour demand,  . 
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The impact of a tariff on domestic employment,  , may be obtained by totally 
differentiating   and dividing the differential by dt: 
t x




d d xt 2 1 + = . (17) 
Inserting (9) into (17) yields: 
  [ 1 2 2 11
2 ) )( (
*
d d d d d P
DET
d
xt + − = . (18)  ]
This may take either sign, since eq. (18) reveals that 
  [ ] 1 2 1 2 11 ) )( sgn sgn d d d d d w xt + − − = . (19) 
The ambiguity generally arises from two conflicting forces. Consider first the case  
of products being substitutes (i.e. d ) and strategic complements: The second 
term in eq. (17) will then be positive, since an increase in t raises the foreign   
price,  Q, and therefore demand for the domestic product. The rise in the foreign   
price, Q, in turn, induces the home firm to charge a higher price as well, thereby 
decreasing demand for the domestic good. I.e., in general, the first term in eq. (17) 
will be negative. The overall impact on domestic demand depends on which of the 
two effects will be the dominating one.   may, for example, be negative if   
demand is very convex (i.e.  ) and if an increase in the rival’s price has a  
0 2 >
0 > d
  9considerable positive impact on the slope of the demand curve facing the domestic 
firm (i.e. ). Eq. (19) reveals, that a sufficient condition for dx/dt to be   
positive is that   and   be negative. From eq. (9) it can be seen that this   
condition ensures that the foreign price response turns out to be relatively large 
compared to the domestic price response
0 12 > d
                                                
11 d 12 d
3. Alternatively spoken, the ambiguity of   
a tariff change may be explained by the fact that a tariff influences foreign  
marginal costs. While stability conditions ensure that the foreign price response 
dominates the domestic price response, domestic demand is more sensitive with 
respect to own-price effects than to foreign price effects, thereby leading to the   
overall ambiguity. 
 
Finally, consider what would happen with a domestic export subsidy: A domestic 
export subsidy shifts the labour demand curve ambiguously outwards, since a   
subsidy basically affects the domestic firm’s marginal cost (see eq. (14)). This   
feature essentially distinguishes our analysis from that of BANDYOPADHYAY et al. 
(2000), who consider export subsidies only. In the Bertrand case, additional 
requirements concerning product demand are necessary so as to ensure that the   
labour demand curve shifts outwards in response to a tariff change. Moreover, due  
to the additional dependence of product demand on foreign prices, the impact of a 
change in the tariff on the labour demand curve’s slope turns out to be ambiguous 
anyway. This raises considerable difficulties when deriving sufficient conditions   
for wages to rise in response to a positive tariff change
4.  
3. Bertrand competition, union wages and intra-industry trade 
NAYLOR (1998) has shown that the impact of product market integration on wages 
critically depends on whether the model is characterised by an inter- or intra- 
industry trade regime. Thus, a natural extension of the preceding discussion 
, 
3 Analogously, consider the case of products being complements ( ) 0 2 < d  and strategic substitutes.  
A rise in the tariff increase the foreign price, Q, which decreases domestic demand, i.e. the second  
term in eq. (17) is unambiguously negative. Moreover, the rise in the price, Q, induces the   
home firm to charge a lower price, P, so that the first term in eq. (17) will generally be positive.  
Again, the overall effect on domestic demand turns out to be ambiguous.  
 
4 Note that the results derived above are also valid for domestic demand reactions in response to a 
change in the foreign wage, w*. This is because, both the foreign wage, w*, and a specific   
domestic import tariff, t, constitute the foreign firm’s marginal cost. The best response of the 
domestic union to an increase in the foreign wage is therefore as ambiguous as the response to a  
rise in the domestic tariff. 
  10involves the consideration of the case of Bertrand competition with reciprocal   
trade. I.e., in contrast to the preceding section, the following analysis considers   
two firms competing for sales in the domestic as well as in the foreign markets,   
with each firm exporting part of its production abroad. The modelling set-up is   
similar to that of VENABLES (1990), who examines welfare effects of trade 
liberalisation in a differentiated oligopolistic product market. However, while 
VENABLES (1990) takes marginal costs as given, the following analysis introduces  
the presence of unions and considers the impact of tariff reductions on wage 
formation.  
3.1. The Bertrand price-setting game 
In what follows, we will adopt the assumption of segmented product markets, i.e.  
each firm regards each country as a separate market and choose for each national 
market profit maximising prices separately. Let P be the price charged by the 
domestic firm for sales in the domestic market, P* the domestic firm’s price   
charged for sales in the foreign market. Similarly, Q represents the foreign firm’s 
price charged for sales in the domestic market and Q* the foreign firm’s price   
charged for sales in the foreign market. Since in section 2 it has been   
demonstrated that union wage responses to tariff reductions turn out to be   
ambiguous with general demand specifications, the following section will   
consider the particular case of linear demand. Assuming symmetry of the demand 
systems in the home and foreign countries, inverse demand functions are   
represented by  
  by x y x P − − =1 ) , (  and  Q bx y y x − − =1 ) , ( , (20) 
 * * 1 *) *, ( * by x y x P − − =  and  * * 1 *) *, ( * bx y y x Q − − = , (21) 
where  x represent the domestic firm’s sales in the domestic market, x* are   
domestic export sales, y are foreign export sales and y* represent the foreign   
firm’s sales in the foreign market. The parameter b represents the degree of   
product rivalry and is assumed to lie in the interval ] [ 1 , 1 − . Solving eqs. (20) and  
  11(21) for x, y, x* and y*, the expressions for home sales, x and y*, and for export  
sales, x* and y, are given by: 
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= . (25) 
Differentiating eqs. (22) – (25) with respect to the rival’s price, it can be seen that  
with  , the products of the firms are substitutes. As b approaches 1, products 
become approximately homogeneous substitutes. Conversely, if  , products   
may be thought of as complements. 
0 b >
0 b <
The domestic and foreign firm’s profit functions take the form  
 * *) * ( ) ( x t w P x w P − − + − = π  (26) 
and   y t w Q y w Q ) * ( * *) * ( * − − + − = π , (27) 
where  t  and  t* are import tariffs levied by the home and foreign countries,   
respectively. I.e., home sales of the domestic firm earn P per unit, whereas export  
sales earn  * t * P −  per unit. Following the assumption of Bertrand conjectures in 
segmented markets, both firms’ maximisation problems are given by 
  π max  and  * maxπ , (28) 
           Q   * P , P * Q ,
taking wages and import tariffs as given. Equilibrium prices then take the form   
 
  12   2
2
4
) * 1 ( ) 1 ( 2
) *, , (
b
b t w b w
t w w P
−
− − − ⋅ − + ⋅





*) 1 ( *) 1 ( 2
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b
b w b t w
t w w P
−
− − ⋅ − + + ⋅
= . (30) 
Symmetric expressions hold for prices, Q and Q*, charged by the foreign firm.   
Eq. (29) reveals that the domestic firm’s price for sales in the domestic market, P, 
depends positively on its own wage, w, and is an increasing (decreasing) function  
of the rival’s marginal costs,  t * w + , when products are substitutes (complements),  
i.e.  . Similarly, according to eq. (30), the domestic firm’s export price  
for sales in the foreign country, P*, depends positively on its own marginal costs, 
, and is an increasing (decreasing) function of the rival’s marginal costs, w*, 
when products are substitutes (complements), i.e. 
) 0 ( 0 < > b b
* t w+
) 0 ( 0 < > b b . 









= − . (31) 
For symmetric tariff outcomes, expression (31) is positive and increasing in the   
tariff. With free trade, prices for home and export sales will be equalised. With 
positive tariffs, each firm charges a higher price for export sales, so as to absorb  
the higher marginal cost incurred from exporting goods from one country to the   
other. Moreover, comparing price-cost margins for the home and export market 
reveals that each firm has a higher mark-up on marginal costs in its home market. 
Hence, as in the Cournot competition case, the export price net of the tariffs falls  
short of the domestic price, i.e. each firm dumps its product into the export market 
(BRANDER and KRUGMAN, 1983). 
Inserting equilibrium prices (29) and (30) in eqs. (22) - (25) yields for equilibrium 
quantities as functions of wages and import tariffs: 
  13 
) 4 )( 1 (
) * 1 ( ) 1 )( 2 (
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t w w x
− −
− − − − −
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t w b w b
t w w y
− −
− − − − −
= . (35) 
Since output equals employment,  * x x +  represents labour demand facing the 
domestic union, whereas   represents foreign labour demand. By virtue of   
eqs. (32) – (35), employment in each firm depends negatively on its own wage   
and on the tariff imposed by the rival country. Moreover, if products are   
substitutes   employment in each firm is positively affected by the rival’s   
wage and the tariff levied by the home country. An increase in the foreign firm’s 
marginal cost therefore shifts the domestic labour demand schedule   
unambiguously outwards
* y y +
), 0 ( > b
5. Similarly, it can be shown, that with linear product 
demand, labour demand shift inwards, if the products are complements (i.e.  < b  
0). 
3.2. The Bertrand wage-setting game 
The present section analyses the Bertrand wage-setting game between national   
unions. It is assumed that labour markets are symmetric and that unions have the 
whole bargaining strength. In order to simplify the analysis, unions are assumed to 
 
                                                 
5 Recall from section 2 that there are, in general, two effects on home demand associated with a  
rise in foreign marginal costs: On the one hand, an increase in foreign marginal costs raises the   
foreign price and therefore demand for the domestic product. On the other hand, with products   
being strategic complements, the rise in the foreign price induces the domestic firm to charge a   
higher price as well, thereby decreasing demand for the domestic good. I.e., with linear demand   
the first effect dominates the second one, thereby increasing demand for the domestic product and 
shifting the labour demand schedule outwards. 
  14maximise the wage bill, which amounts to risk neutral union members and an   
alternative wage,  , set equal to zero. The domestic union therefore maximises 
  w
*) ( x x w U   , (36)  + =
whereas the foreign union maximises 
 *). ( * * y y w U + =  (37) 
Since unions correctly anticipate the impact of wages on product market   
competition, the optimal domestic wage, is given by 
 *)) ( max( arg x x w w + = , (38) 
   w  
where labour demand,  , is given by eqs. (31) and (32). Maximising (36)   
with respect to w yields 
* x x +
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w b t b t b b b
t t w w
−
⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − − − ⋅ + ⋅
= . (39) 
According to eq. (39), w, is an increasing function of foreign marginal costs, t and  
w*, if products are substitutes ( ) 0 > b . Hence with products being substitutes,   
wages (or, in general, marginal costs) are strategic complements from the union’s 
point of view. 
This is due to the fact that a rise in foreign marginal costs shifts labour demand 
unambiguously outwards (see eqs. (32) and (33)), thereby improving the domestic 
firm’s competitive position and enabling the domestic union to settle for a higher 
wage
6.  
                                                 
6 Note that with linear product demand, only the movement of the labour demand curve turns out  
to be relevant for the union wage response, since the slope of labour demand will be unaffected by 
a change in foreign marginal costs. 
 
  15Similarly, w decreases with t and w*, if products are complements ( . Hence, 
marginal costs, i.e. wages and the domestic import tariff, are strategic substitutes   
from the union’s point of view, since a rise in foreign marginal costs   
unambiguously shifts the labour demand curve inwards, thereby inducing the 
domestic union to settle for a lower wage. Hence, in contrast to the homogeneous 
Cournot case, in the present framework, the strategic interaction between national 
wage outcomes is crucially determined by the nature and degree of product   
rivalry. The stronger the products are substitutes or complements, i.e. the higher   
the absolute value of b, the more are national wages affected by foreign labour   
market outcomes. 
) 0 < b
For the homogeneous Cournot case, the strategic complement property of wages   
has been derived and discussed by a number of authors (see e.g. DAVIDSON  
(1988), PADILLA et al. (1996)). Strategic complementarity of national wages has 
important implications for the impact of international product market integration   
on national bargaining systems. CORNEO (1995) discusses these implications and 
examines how institutional changes in national bargaining system affects wage 
formation in other countries. He shows that country specific shocks affecting 
institutional factors and therefore national wages influence foreign bargaining 
outcomes by altering the competitive position of foreign firms. In this context, one  
of his main findings is that national institutional changes affecting collective 
bargaining outcomes spill-over to other countries due to the positive externality 
between national wage levels
7. Note that in the present analysis, with products   
being complements and wages strategic substitutes, there may be even negative   
spill-over effects due to changes in institutional changes affecting national wage 
outcomes. The analysis therefore suggests, that country specific shocks affecting 
foreign national wages may even lead to diverging wage movements in the home 
country, if demand for the domestic product strongly depends on foreign prices   
for complementary goods. 
                                                 
7  This transmission mechanism is particularly striking when considering dichotomous shifts from   
no-trade equilibria characterised by prohibitive tariff outcomes to fully integrated product market 
equilibria with zero tariffs. By comparing pre-trade wages to wages negotiated in an   
internationally integrated product market, CORNEO (1995) shows that product market integration 
mitigates international wage differentials due to country specific labour market institutions.  
 
  16Describing the outcome of wage determination in the foreign country analogously  
to eq. (39) and solving simultaneously for the domestic and foreign wage yields: 
) 2 4 ( ) 2 4 ( 2
* ) 2 9 8 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 4 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 2
*) , (
2 2 b b b b
t b b t b b b b b b
t t w
− + ⋅ − − ⋅
⋅ + − − ⋅ − ⋅ + − + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
=
4 2 2 2
 (40) 
Similarly, a symmetric expression holds for the foreign wage, w*. 
3.3. Impact of trade liberalisation on wages, employment and welfare 
Due to the reciprocal trade framework it is necessary to distinguish between   
unilateral and bilateral tariff reductions. Investigating wage and employment   
effects of unilateral tariff reductions establishes the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: 
A unilateral domestic tariff reduction (i) reduces (raises) the domestic wage, (ii) 
reduces (raises) domestic employment, if products are substitutes (complements). 
A unilateral foreign tariff reduction (iii) raises the domestic wage and (iv) raises 
domestic employment, regardless of the nature of product rivalry. 
An immediate corollary from Proposition 1 is that while a unilateral domestic  
tariff reduction reduces (raises) domestic union utility, if products are substitutes 
(complements), a unilateral foreign tariff reduction always raises domestic union 
utility, regardless of the sign of b.. 
Proof: 
(i)  Differentiating eq. (40) with respect to t yields 
, 0 ) (
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 for b . (41)  0 ) (< >
  17Differentiating eq. (41) with respect to b it can easily be checked that   
, i.e. the sensitivity of w with respect to t is increasing in the   
degree of product rivalry. This result reflects that the extent to which the   
domestic firm’s competitive position is deteriorated by a domestic tariff   
reduction will be the larger the closer the products are substitutes. 
0 2 > dtdb / w d
(ii)  See the Appendix 
(iii)  Differentiating eq. (40) with respect to t yields 
, 0
) 2 4 )( 2 4 ( 2
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 since 9 ( −  for  0 ) 2 8 4 2 > + b b ] [ 1 , 1 − ∈ b . 
(iv)  See the Appendix. 
The result that the sign of dw/dt does depend on the sign of b may be explained by  
the fact that a domestic tariff only indirectly affects domestic sales, x, through its 
impact on foreign marginal costs: A domestic tariff reduction lowers the foreign 
firm’s marginal cost and therefore its price for export sales, Q. If the products are 
substitutes, domestic demand for the domestic product, x, is decreased, inducing   
the domestic union to moderate its wage demand. If the products are, in contrast, 
complements, domestic demand for the domestic product, x, rises, thereby   
enabling the domestic union to charge a higher wage. Moreover, part (iii) of 
Proposition 1 establishes that in equilibrium, i.e. after taking into account the   
union’s wage reaction, overall domestic employment,  , is reduced   
(increased), for b . Hence, the direct negative (positive) effect of a tariff 
reduction on domestic sales, x, more than offsets possible positive (negative)   
effects on employment arising from the domestic unions’ wage responses to the   
tariff change. 
* x x +
0 ) (< >
  18In contrast, the result that the sign of dw/dt* does not depend on the nature of   
product rivalry may be explained by the fact that a foreign tariff directly affects 
domestic demand through its impact on domestic marginal costs: According to eq. 
(30), a reduction of the foreign tariff reduces the domestic firm’s marginal cost   
and therefore the price for export sales, P*. As a consequence, with linear   
demand
8, export demand, x*, and therefore overall demand,  , for the   
domestic product is raised (eq. (33)), thereby increasing the domestic union’s   
optimal wage. Part (iv) of Proposition 1 establishes that overall domestic demand  
is raised in equilibrium, i.e. after taking into account the union’s wage reaction.   
This is because the direct positive effect of a tariff reduction on export sales, x*; 
outweighs possible negative effects on employment, 
* x x +
* x x +  arising from the   
unions’ wage responses to the tariff change. 
Investigating the impact of bilateral reductions and imposing a symmetric   
tariff outcome t  establishes the following proposition:  T * t = =
Proposition 2: 
Bilateral trade liberalisation (i) increase the domestic wage, (ii) raises domestic 
employment, (iii) raises union utility, (iv) reduces (raises) firm profits above   
(below) some critical level  π T , (v) reduces (raises) consumer surplus above   
(below) some critical level  CS T , (vi) raises domestic welfare, regardless of the sign  
of b. Symmetric results hold for the foreign country. 
Proof: 
(i)    Imposing a symmetric tariff outcome, eq. (40) reduces to  
) 2 4 ( 2





− − ⋅ +
= . (43) 
so that dw/dT< , for  0 ] [ 1 , 1 b − ∈ . 
                                                 
8 Recall that with linear product demand, the impact of the foreign price change on domestic   
 
  19(ii-v):  See the Appendix. 
If  , the preceding discussion has shown, that a bilateral tariff reduction raises 
export sales, x*, as well as home sales, x. If, in contrast, b , the decrease in   
home sales, x, associated with a tariff reduction is outweighed by the rise in export 
sales, x*, thereby increasing total employment for the domestic union and leading  
to a higher wage. 
0 < b
0 >
In equilibrium, after taking into account the unions’ wage reactions, bilateral tariff 
reductions raise domestic employment,  , regardless of the sign of b. Hence,  
the direct positive effect on export sales, x*, more than offsets negative effects on 
employment arising from direct negative effects on domestic sales, x, if   and 
from wage increases in response to the bilateral tariff reduction. 
* x x +
0 > b
CS
With respect to consumer surplus, Proposition 2 states that below some critical   
level  T  bilateral tariff reductions give rise to an increase in consumer surplus, 
whereas for tariff levels above  CS T  consumer surplus is reduced. The intuition   
behind this result can be explained by the fact that bilateral tariff reduction may 
increase the domestic price, P, whereas the price for imports, Q, is unambiguously 
reduced. The last effect will more than offset the first one, if tariffs are sufficiently 
low and import levels sufficiently high. Form eq. (29) it can be seen that the 
ambiguity of a bilateral tariff reduction with respect to the home price, P, arises   
from two conflicting forces: On the one hand a bilateral tariff reduction raises   
foreign and domestic wages, which tends to increase P. On the other hand, a tariff 
reduction decreases foreign marginal costs, thereby inducing the domestic firm to 
charge a lower (higher) price, if products are substitutes (complements). If b is 
sufficiently large, i.e. if products are very similar, the effects on P via foreign 
marginal costs dominates the effect arising from higher wages, thereby inducing   
the home firm to charger a lower price in response to a tariff reduction. The fact  
that a tariff’s impact on export prices, Q and P*, is unambiguously positive may   
be explained by the fact that a tariff directly affects the export price via its impact  
on the firms’ marginal export costs. 
 
 
demand dominates the impact of the domestic price response. 
  20The intuition that domestic profits are a non-monotonic function of tariffs is the 
following: Whereas a bilateral tariff reduction has an ambiguous impact on the   
price charged in the home market, P, and production for the home market, x, it 
unambiguously raises the wage charged by the domestic union, w, lowers the   
product price for sales in the foreign market, P*, and raises exports, x*. Moreover, 
marginal costs arising form delivering the foreign market are reduced. The last   
effects can be shown to dominate negative marginal effects on profits if tariffs are 
sufficiently low and the trade volume sufficiently large. 
4. Conclusions 
In a framework of a unionised international Bertrand duopoly with differentiated 
products, the present paper has examined the consequences of trade liberalisation   
for union wage. The analysis suggests that national wages are likely to be   
strategic complements (substitutes), if products are ordinary substitutes 
(complements). The result that wages may me strategic substitutes has important 
consequences for international labour market interdependencies. More   
specifically, the results suggest that national wage outcomes may even diverge as   
a result of product market integration, if demand for the domestic product strongly 
depends on foreign prices for complementary goods. 
Under the assumption of linear demand it has been shown that bilateral trade 
liberalisation always leads to higher union set wages and union utilities, regardless  
of the nature of product rivalry. Hence, as in NAYLOR (1998) increased product 
market competition does not necessarily lead to more competitive outcomes in the 
labour market. Analysing the consequences of unilateral tariff reductions, it has   
been shown that foreign tariff reductions always give rise to higher union wages   
and utilities, whereas the impact of unilateral domestic tariff reductions depends   
on the nature of product rivalry. The analysis therefore suggests that organised 
labour’s attitudes towards product market integration should critically depend on   
the question which products are subject to trade liberalisation and on whether   
tariff removals are undertaken unilaterally or bilaterally.  
  21Appendix 
Proposition 1 
(ii) and (iv:) Comparative static effects on domestic employment  
Inserting equilibrium wages, eq. (40), into eqs. (32) and (33) yields equilibrium 
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Proposition 2: 
(ii): Comparative static effects on domestic employment 
Imposing symmetric tariff outcomes  T * t t = =  and differentiating (32’) + (33’)   
with respect to T gives 
0













 for  ] [ 1 ; 1 − ∈ b . (A.3) 
  22(iv): Comparative static effects on domestic profits 
Inserting equilibrium wages, eq. (40), into eqs. (29) and (30) yields equilibrium   
prices   and Q , denoted as eqs. (29’) and (30’) Substituting eqs. (32’), 
(33’) and (29’), (30’) and (40) into the profit equation (26), imposing symmetric   
tariff outcomes   and differentiating the resulting expression with respect  
to T gives 
*) , ( t t P *) , ( t t












, where  (A.4) 
0 16 168 28 129 14 42 2 5 80 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 > + − − + + − − − = ∆ b b b b b b b b  for  ] [ 1 1; − ∈ b  
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(v): Comparative static effects on consumer surplus 
Imposing  T * t t = =  yields  * P Q = . Differentiating (29’) and (30’) with respect to  
T yields: 
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(vi): Comparative static effects on domestic welfare 
Inserting equilibrium wages, eq. (40), equilibrium prices, (29’) and (30’), and 
equilibrium quantities, (32’) – (35’) into the welfare equation 










, where  (A.8) 
0 32 136 52 69 23 11 3 80 2 3 4 5 6 7 > − − + + − − + = Π b b b b b b b  for b ,  ][ 1 1; − ∈
0 ) 1 ( ) 2 )( 3 )( 2 ( 4 2 2 2 2 > − + − − = Ψ b b b b  for  ] [ 1 1; b − ∈ , 
0 ) 2 4 )( 1 )( 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( 2 2 2 2 2 < − − + − + − − = Ω b b b b b b  for b ][ 1 1; − ∈ . 
From (A.8) it follow that dW/dT 0 <  for T .  0 >
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